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After a rather uneventful election campaign, the results of the May 1986 Dutch parlia- 
mentary election were a surprise to virtually all involved. Since the introduction of regular 
opinion polling in the 1960s no election has taken place when the polls were ‘wrong’. 
However, in 1986 last minute shifts that were stronger than had ever occurred in the 
Netherlands produced results that differed significantIy from the predictions based upon the 
polls published immediately prior to the election. 
The Climate of Opinion 
Whether the publication of opinion polls influences voter choice is still a matter of political 
and scientific debate. That opinion polls greatly affected the climate of opinion in the period 
leading to the 1986 election in the Netherlands can. however, hardly be disputed. The 
success in previous years of the polls in indicating days, weeks, even months in advance 
what the outcome would be led to great confidence in their predictive ability. In the Dutch 
national election study of which the first wave of interviews was held approximately a month 
before the elections the respondents showed a considerable awareness of the polls and 
confidence in their results (see Table 1). 
Not only did the general public show considerable confidence in opinion polls. the party 
politicians based their strategies at least in part on poll results and the journalists employed 
them as a guideline in their presentation of the campaign. In the months preceding the 
election, attention focused heavily upon two questions. Would the government coalition of 
Christian-Democrats and Liberals be able to retain its majority in Parliament? And. how 
large would the gains of the opposition Labour party be? The basis for these questions can be 
seen in the following graphs representing the trends in party SUppOrt for the four largest 
parties and for the government coalition parties together for each week in the period between 
the 1982 and 1986 elections. (See Figure 1) 
For more than a year following the 1982 election the coalition parties (CDX and VVD) 
held a comfortable margin in the polls. By fall 1983 (approximately week 60 in Figure 1) 
both parties began to lose as the Labour party (PvdA) began to climb. At the end of 1984 
(week 120) the latter polled a historic high of 40 per cent while the coalition had dropped 
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T.\BLE 1. Awareness of and confidence in opinion polls. 
Prior to the elections numerous opinion polls are held in 
order to determine how people are planning to vote. How 
often have you come across the results of such polls in the 
newspaper or on radio and television? 
V’ery often 73 7% __.
Regularly 36.8 
Occasionally 24.6 
(Almost) never 13.3 
DKiNA 2.6 
100.0% 
How well, in your opinion, do the opinion polls reflect the 
support for the political parties? 
Verv well 1.5 
W&l 50.6 
hloderately well 30.6 
Poorly 3.0 
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FIGURE 1. Support for the major parties on a weekly basis, from the 1982 to the 1986 election 
(13 September 1982 to 19 May 1986). 
Source: Weekly polls by NIPO. 
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well below the crucial 50 per cent line. As of mid- 1985, however, the CDA rose sharply in 
popularity while the PvdA dropped a little. Still, according to the pollsters, the PvdA would 
clearly remain the largest party and it would be a toss-up whether or not the coalition would 
hold on to its majority. 
In an exceptional move. the Christian-Democrats in 1986 declared their preference for a 
coalition partner prior to the election. If possible they would continue the coalition with the 
Liberals. The Liberals wholeheartedly supported this idea. The standing of the coalition 
in the polls thus helped lead to open discussion, even within the partner parties, as to what 
course should be taken should they fall below the 76 seats needed for a parliamentary 
majority. Speculation concerned whether or not support should be sought from the small 
orthodox religious parties of the right. With this possibility of being able to play a key role in 
the cabinet formation process and with the assistance of the evangelical broadcasting 
network, these small religious parties received more attention than during most recent 
election campaigns. 
The Results 
Although the national election study results show that only somewhat more than one-third 
(36%) of the respondents actually thought the coalition would lose its majority, given the 
aforementioned build-up, virtually all observers were surprised by the results. Not only did 
the coalition not lose its majority, it retained its six-seat margin. Most surprising, in fact the 
only result that fell outside confidence intervals of the poll estimates, was the success of the 
Christian-Democrats. For the first time since the former Catholic party and the two major 
Protestant parties joined forces in 1977 in an effort to stop their further decline. substantial 
gains were registered. To the shock of the Labour party, the Christian-Democrats even 
emerged as the largest party. Seldom have losers-the Liberals-been so jubilant (the 
coalition could be retained). and winners-Labour-been so depressed. 
TABLE 2. Election results and parliamentary seats for 1981, 1982, and 1986. 
Vote % Seats 
1981 1982 1986 1981 1982 1986 
Major parties 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 
Liberal party (VVD) 
Iahour party (PvdA) 
Small left 
Communist party (CPN) 
Pacifist-Socialist party (PSP) 
Radical party (PPR) 
Orthodox religious right 
Reformed Political party (SGP) 
Reformed Political Union (GPV) 
Reformed Political Federation (RPF) 
Other 
Democrats ‘66 (D’66) 
Evangelical People’s party (EVP) 
Centre party (CP) 
Miscellaneous 
30.8 29.4 34.6 48 45 54 
17.3 23.1 17.4 26 36 27 
28.3 30.4 33.3 44 47 52 
2.1 1.8 0.6 3 3 0 
2.1 2.3 1.2 3 3 1 
2.0 1.7 1.3 3 2 2 
2.0 1.9 1.8 3 3 3 
0.8 0.8 1.0 1 1 1 
1.2 1.5 0.9 2 2 1 
11.1 4.3 6.1 17 6 9 
0.5 0.7 0.2 0 1 0 
0.1 0.8 0.4 0 1 0 
2.4 1.4 1.2 0 0 0 
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In addition to the Christian-Democrats who now hold 54 seats (a gain of 9) and the 
Labour party with 52 seats (a gain of 5), the only other winner at this election was the 
Democrats ‘66. This party. which in its twenty year history has gone through two cycles of 
success and defeat. rebounded once again. With the comeback of co-founder and leader, 
Hans van Mierlo, the party gained 3 seats for a new total of 9. 
In terms of actual number of seats lost, the Liberals were the greatest losers, dropping 9 
seats to 27. More devastating, however, was the loss sustained by the Communist party. 
This party has been represented in Parliament continuously since the first election under 
universal suffrage in 1918. but in 1986 did not gain the 0.67 per cent of the vote necessary 
for retention of a single seat. Their losses were part of a general collapse of the small leftist 
parties. The Pacifist-Socialists (PSP) were able to retain only one of their 3 seats in 
Parliament, and although the Radicals (PPR) again gained two seats. they did so with 
2 1,000 fewer votes. Together these three parties thus fell from 8 to only 3 seats. 
On the right, the small religious parties, perhaps aided by the additional publicity. 
managed basically to hold their own. with only the RPF losing a seat. 
In addition to losses by parties with many years of representation, two parties lacking a 
long tradition lost their seats. The more left-oriented religious party. the Evangelical 
People’s party (EVP) seems to have failed to gain a permanent place in the political 
spectrum. And, to the relief of virtually all observers. the Centre Party. which bases its 
appeal on a thinly disguised hatred of ethnic minorities. also lost the single seat it had first 
gained in 1982. 
Voter Shifts 
From which parties did the winners gain and to whom did the losers lose? As the results of 
the second wave of interviews for the national election study are not available at the time of 
writing, the only analysis of voter shifts must be based upon the exit poll conducted by 
Bureau IiiTOMART on election day. In addition to the disadvantage of utilizing recall data 
for the individual vote in 1982 (especially since municipal elections were held only two 
months before the 1986 parliamentary election), exit polls have the disadvantage of being 
unable to indicate how many of a party’s 1982 voters chose not to cast a vote in 1986. 
Nevertheless the IiiTOMXRT data do provide insight into the voter movements that 
produced the surprising outcome. 
Figure 2 is based upon those respondents who reported a vote choice for both elections 
and shows the net gain or loss ensuing from the interchange of voters between the parties. 
FIGURE 2. Net vote shifts between parties or party groups. Percentages of the total number of 
respondents of INTOMART. exit-poll reporting vote in 1982 and 1986 elections. (Set vote shifts 
smaller than 0.1% omitted.) 
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Before looking at the voter shifts. one should note that if one includes D’66 with the left 
and the Christian-Democrats with the right the overall balance between left and right 
remained virtually unchanged. In fact there are very few voter switches between the left and 
right. Virtually none occurs between the small left parties and the orthodox right or the 
Centre Party, and interchanges between the small left parties and the Liberals are almost as 
rare. 
If, however, one places the Christian-Democrats at the centre of the political spectrum, a 
position they generally claim to hold, one sees very clearly that the net result of voter 
interchanges between parties produced what might be described as a centripetal election. In 
almost every case the net interchanges result in an arrow pointing towards the centre. The 
beleagured small left parties lost heavily to the Labour party, but also to D’66 and even to 
the Christian-Democrats. Similarly, the Labour party suffered losses to both D’66 and to the 
Christian-Democrats. To the latter’s right, strong gains were registered from the Liberals, 
but also from the orthodox religious right. The only exception to this centripetal pattern is 
the interchange between Liberal and Labour. Nevertheless, this was clearly an election in 
which the net effect of voter shifts was a move to the centre. 
The Issues 
In order to understand the implications of the 1986 election one must not only understand 
the shifts of voters between the parties but something of the motivations that produced the 
shifts. For a fuller understanding of the motivations of the voters we must an-ait more 
detailed data analysis, but some hypotheses may be proposed here and some preliminary 
conclusions may be drawn. In attempting to examine the potential effects of political issues 
on voter choice, one is immediately struck by the apparent avoidance by the major parties of 
a direct confrontation on the most pressing current issues in Dutch politics. A combination 
of circumstances created a willingness or even desire among all parties to deemphasize such 
major issues as nuclear weapons, nuclear power, broadcasting policy, and euthanasia. 
During its first years in office the government wrestled with the question of whether or 
not to deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles on Dutch soil. On 1 November 1985 the 
government decision to do so became definite and Parliament later accepted the treaty that 
would allow preparations for deployment to begin. Despite the public protest that had 
preceded the decision, once it had been taken the issue lost virtually all of its electoral 
impact. Labour’s opposition to deployment may have contributed to its rise in the polls. Still, 
it could not expect to gain much from stressing the matter as the election approached. Few 
additional votes could be drained from the small left parties, while further opposition would 
endanger the already dim prospects to form a coalition with the Christian-Democrats. 
Two other issues on which there was even disagreement within the government 
coalition were consciously avoided because mphasis would greatly complicate the coalition 
formation process. On the question of broadcasting policy, and in particular nhether 
commercial television might be allowed and whether the ‘pillarized’ structure of Dutch 
television should be protected, the Liberals differed from both their coalition partners and 
the opposition. Opinion polls showed considerable public support for their position, but 
attempts to exploit the issue would only antagonize their coalition partners. Labour and the 
Christian-Democrats were in more general agreement in their opposition to commercial 
television and protection of the existing system, but few electoral gains could be expected 
from emphasizing these positions. 
A second issue on which the parties agreed it was not proper to attempt to make electoral 
gains involved what action a doctor might take when a terminally ill patient requested to die. 
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D’66 had introduced legislation which would remove compliance by the doctor as a 
punishable criminal offence and set up a procedure to control and administer such requests. 
The Liberal members of parliament had been inclined to support this legislation as would the 
Labour opposition. The Christian-Democrats, however, felt that the initiative went much 
too far. Finally. the Cabinet came with a proposal that still had to be worked out before intro- 
duction into Parliament, but which would be submitted to the Council of State for advice. By 
doing so any open break between the coalition partners could be avoided, discussion could be 
postponed until after the election, and the issue could be ignored as much as possible during 
the campaign. 
Despite such overt attempts at depoliticizing major issues, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
was an event that could not be ignored. The government had decided in 1985 that at least 
two new nuclear plants would be built in the Netherlands. Although public opinion was 
opposed a parliamentary majority, including CDA and VVD, supported it. It seemed likely 
that ‘Chernobyl’ would piay into the hands of the opposition part_ies who had voted against 
the expansion of nuclear energy. However, a quick change of position by the government 
parties immediately defused the issue. Premier Lubbers announced that the decision on new 
plants would be postponed pending full investigation of safety procedures and even hinted 
that the postponement might be indefinite. It might even be necessary to dismantle the 
existing plants. Although Vice-Premier van Aardenne (Liberal) initially announced that the 
Russian problem was no more serious than a forest fire, he was quickly silenced by his party 
which fell in behind the Lubbers position. By the time the cows were again in the pasture no 
substantiai electoral gains could be made from this issue. 
With such potentially explosive issues effectively defused, one might wonder just what 
was stressed during the campaign. The government parties attempted to capitalize upon 
what was perceived to be a generally optimistic mood within the country. They stressed that 
although some sacrifices might still be necessary the worst of the economic crisis had passed. 
The Liberals. having suffered several leadership problems simply attempted to stress the 
success of gotrernmental policies, even though it was obvious that much of that success 
would rub off on to the Christian-Democrat Lubbers. Labour charged that the costs of 
recovery had not been borne equally, but could not counteract fears that this was not the 
time for the uncertainties of a new attempt to form a Labour-Christian-Democratic cabinet. 
This general mood of the country is reflected in some preliminary results from the 
national election study. Respondents were asked whether they thought that governmental 
policy over the previous four years had had an effect upon their personal financial situation. 
unemployment. and the general economic situation. The results in Table 3 show that few 
people felt that their personal situation had been improved; either it was unaffected or had 
been affected negatively. On unemployment more respondents felt governmental policies 
had had a positive effect, but when asked about the general economic situation. a clear 
majority of the respondents indicated that governmental policies had had a positive effect. 
TABLE 3. Perceptions of influence of governmental policies. 
What effect has governmental policy Positive 






personal financial situation 
unemployment 
general economic situation 
11% 39% 46% 1% 100% 
36% 22% 36% 100% 
51% 16% 24% 100% 
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Such results seem to indicate that, although many people did not feel that governmental 
policies had benefited them personally or that the government had had that much impact 
upon unemployment, there was generally a fairly positive mood. How these responses are 
related to vote choice is a matter for later analysis. 
In addition to this general mood, the Christian-Democrats capitalized upon the popularity 
of Premier Ruud Lubbers, with ‘Let Lubbers finish his job’ as their campaign slogan. 
Published opinion poll results showed that Lubbers was highly regarded by voters of all 
parties. He received high ratings on such qualities as ‘sympathetic, competent, trustworthy, 
etc’. On the other hand, Labour leader Joop den Uyl who at 66 had passed the age at which 
most Dutch politicians retire and the youthful Ed Nijpels as leader of the Liberals received 
generally lower scores. Even their own party supporters rated them only marginally higher 
than they did Lubbers, on some characteristics Lubbers or other party leaders were actually 
rated better by Liberal and Labour voters, while the ratings for den Uyl and Nijpels from the 
other party followers were very low. 
Such dissatisfaction or disillusionment within the Liberal and Labour parties with their 
top candidate is also found in the election results. In the Netherlands, as there is no special 
box or circle for a party vote on the ballot paper, voters generally express their choice by 
marking the first name on the list of candidates. Seldom do more than lo- 15 per cent of a 
party’s voters express a preference for a candidate lower on the list. In 1986 Lubbers’ 
popularity led to 96 per cent of Christian-Democratic votes being cast for him, one of the 
highest figures for a major party in recent elections. On the other hand, Liberal and Labour 
voters cast a record number of preference votes as only 67 per cent and 61 per cent cast their 
votes for Nijpels and den Uyl. 
Finally, we must consider the possible effects of the media on voter choice. In attempting 
to explain his incorrect prediction of Christian-Democratic votes, one of the major pollsters 
in the country argued that the debate on the eve of the election between the three major 
leaders had influenced many voters. Indeed, most observers and some preliminary research 
seems to indicate that Lubbers was the ‘winner’ of the debate. While Nijpels and den Uyl 
argued, Lubbers assumed the role of the quiet, trustworthy statesman. Yet this would seem 
to overestimate the effect of this single debate. During the last week of the campaign Lubbers 
appeared extensively on television virtually every evening-in debate with den Uyl. 
answering questions of young voters along with the other leaders, in debate with the small 
religious parties on the evangelical broadcasting station, and in a two-hour programme with 
all the ministers in his cabinet. Such extensive coverage seems to have contributed to the 
general feeling that change was inopportune and have allowed Lubbers to turn his personal 
popularity into votes. 
Long Term Impacts 
Following any election one may ask what implications the results may have for develop- 
ments within the party system. For the Netherlands much has been written of the ‘depillar- 
ization’ of the social system and dealignment within the political system. Lacking extensive 
data, only some aspects of the importance of the 1986 election may be touched upon here. 
In discussions of the process of dealignment and realignment which began in the middle 
1960s the importance of new parties is always noted. Between the reestablishment of the 
party system following the Second World War and 1959, only a single Catholic splinter 
group disturbed the dominance of eight parties that had been represented in Parliament 
since the introduction of universal suffrage. As dealignment set in, new political parties 
began to achieve seats in Parliament. In 1971 and 1972, 14 parties gained at least one seat. 
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As a reaction to their losses, the three major Christian democratic parties joined in 1977 to 
present a common list under the name Christian Democratic Appeal, thus lowering the 
number of parties by two. Some of the new parties (DS’70 and Farmers party) lost their 
support and thus further reduced the number. The 1986 election marks only the second 
election since 1959 in which no new party gained a seat. The Communists. Evangelical 
People’s party, and the Centre party all failed to gain a seat, reducing the number of parties 
with parliamentary representation to nine. The three major parties dominate to a degree 
unprecedented in recent years. Although Democrats ‘66 recovered somewhat once again, 
their future position in the political constellation remains unclear. And at least for the 
moment. the importance of smaller parties has been greatly reduced. 
Perhaps more important than the decline in the number of parties in Parliament is the 
possible future position of the Christian Democratic Appeal. Until 1986 its appeal had been 
virtually exclusively to those with a strong religious identification. Although election study 
data are not yet available, there are indications that its appeal wasbroadened in this election. 
Whereas among those with no religious identification. only about 4 per cent generally cast a 
vote for the Christian-Democrats, one pollster has claimed that in 1986 11 per cent did so. 
Such a figure would be far higher than in any previous election. The distribution of the votes 
over the provinces is also more homogeneous than ever, indicating that the party relied less 
heavily upon support in the southern, more Catholic provinces. Gains were also made in 
more secularized areas such as the cities. Moreover. the ‘greying’ of Christian democratic 
support was (at least temporarily) stopped. In 1986 the Christian-Democrats received the 
largest share of votes among young, first time voters: this had never been the case since the 
changes in Dutch politics in the mid-1960s. 
For-at least twenty years, the CDA and its predecessors have only been able to fight rear- 
guard actions to attempt to hold on to voters. For the first time, it would appear that in 1986 
the party was actually able to compete with the secular parties to gain votes. This in itself 
marks a major development in Dutch politics. It poses the possibility that the CDA can 
develop into a catch-all party with an appeal beyond its religious base. Whether in doing so it 
continues to drift to the right is a matter for future concern. 
If it does, however, one may wonder what the future of the Liberals may be. Will they be 
reduced to the pre-1959 size of less than 10 per cent of the vote? Will they move (perhaps 
even joining with D’66) to the middle of the political spectrum to play a role similar to their 
colleagues in West Germany? Or will they open the possibility of a coalition with the Labour 
party in an attempt finally to force the Christian-Democrats into the opposition? 
Similar questions may be posed for the Labour party. The number of seats gained in 
Parliament in 1986 was only one less than the highest result ever achieved (in 1977). The 
party made important inroads, especially in the south, and thus contributed to the 
homogenization or nationalization of electoral support. Yet the disappointment was great, 
since even with the support of D’66 and the small left they fell 8 per cent and were 11 seats 
short of the majority needed to form a Cabinet. How to achieve the dream of a leftist majority 
remained a major question. In order to participate in government Labour continues to be 
dependent upon the willingness of the Christian-Democrats to join with them or upon the 
remote possibility that a coalition with the Liberals could be formed. Electoral success or 
failure has little impact upon this position. 
In conclusion, one may state that the results of the 1986 election were far more 
interesting than most observers had expected. The results were surprising. posing challeng- 
ing questions for subsequent data analysis. For the long term, the election may have lasting 
importance in terms of the alignment of both voters and the parties. 
